Superfund: A Super Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity by Noyes, Lynne E.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 55 
Issue 2 Spring 1990 Article 4 
Spring 1990 
Superfund: A Super Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity 
Lynne E. Noyes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lynne E. Noyes, Superfund: A Super Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 55 MO. L. REV. (1990) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.'
In June of 1989 the United States Supreme Court held that the
eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution does not bar a
private citizen from seeking monetary damages in federal court from a
state in an action arising under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and its subse-
quent amendments.2 In upholding the decision of the Third Circuit
,Court of Appeals in United States v. Union Gas Co.3 (Union II), five
members of the Court found that CERCLA4 as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),' clearly
expresses a congressional intent to permit suits against a state in
federal court for monetary damages for conduct described in the
statute.' The plurality agreed that Congress has the constitutional
authority to override the state's eleventh amendment sovereignimmunity when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause.7 To fully
understand the ramifications of this decision one must review the
circumstances leading to this case; the purpose of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA);
and the history and case law behind the eleventh amendment.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
2. Id.
3. 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Union I1l.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
5. SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
6. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). The opinion was
written by Justice Brennan. The first two parts were joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
concurring opinion.
7. Id. In parts III and IV of the opinion, Justice Brennan was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice White wrote a separate
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I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
The predecessors of the Union Gas Co. owned and operated a
carburetted water gas plant close to Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg,
Pennsylvania between 1890 and 1948.8 After 1948, the plant was
dismantled. In 1953 and 1970, Union Gas Co. sold part of its land near
the creek to the Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. which then granted
easements over the land to the Borough of Stroudsburg. 9 In 1950,
because of flooding problems, the borough, the State of Pennsylvania,
and the Army Corps of Engineers dug levees and erected dikes,
redirecting the flow of Brodhead Creek.' In early 1980, the borough
assigned its easements to the state." In October 1980, the state was
excavating at the creek when it struck a large deposit of coal tar that
began to seep into Brodhead Creek. 2 Brodhead Creek thus became
the first "Superfund" site in the nation.13 To clean up the coal tar that
had seeped into the creek and to prevent further seepage, the state and
federal government dredged the back channel of the creek and installed
a slurry wall.' 4 The federal government reimbursed the state for all
its clean-up costs-approximately $720,000.' 5
. The federal government sought recoupment of its clean-up costs
from the Union Gas Co. in the District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 6 The United States filed under sections 9604 and 9607
of CERCLA and various sections of the Clean Water Act.'" The United
States claimed Union Gas was liable because the government believed
the coal tar had been deposited into the ground near Brodhead Creek
by Union Gas and its predecessors as a by-product of the carburetted
water processing. 18 Union Gas denied liability and filed a third party
complaint against the State and the Borough of Sfroudsburg.19 Union






13. Id at 374 n.1.
14. Union I, 792 F.2d 372 at 374.
15. Id
16. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3), (f)(2) (1948).
This Note will not discuss liability under the Federal Water Pollution Act
because Union Gas did not file a third party claim with respect to these claims.
Union I, 792 F.2d at 375 n.2.
18. Union I, 792 F.2d at 375.
19. Id. The Borough of Stroudsburg did not raise an eleventh amendment
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Gas alleged that as "owners and operators" of the facility at Brodhead
Creek the State and borough were responsible for the release of any
hazardous substance. 2° Union Gas further claimed the State should
pay for the clean-up. Union Gas believed the State was liable under
CERCLA because they had "negligently caused, or contributed to, the
discharge of coal tar into Brodhead Creek" by their recent excavation
and earlier construction of dikes and levees.2 ' Believing the eleventh
amendment barred the third-party complaint, the State filed a motion
to dismiss.
22
The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss because it
did not believe CERCLA contained a clear statement of congressional
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity which is required for Congress
to abrogate a state's immunity from liability in federal court.'
Therefore, the district court failed to address the issue whether
Congress could remove a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to its
powers under the commerce clause as opposed to its powers under the
fourteenth amendment. Subsequently, Union Gas and the United
States reached a settlement, which resulted in a voluntary dismissal of
the primary claim.'
Union Gas appealed the dismissal of its claim against the State.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' agreeing that CERCLA
did not contain the requisite clear congressional intent to abrogate a
state's eleventh amendment immunity. So, initially, the Third Circuit
did not address whether Congress can abrogate a state's immunity
pursuant to the commerce clause. Union Gas petitioned for certiorari
on October 8, 1986.26 On October 17th, the President signed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)' to
CERCLA.28 The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's prior
defense in the district court, nor did they appear on the initial appeal to the
Third Circuit. Therefore the Third Circuit did not discuss or decide whether the
eleventh amendment immunity would reach the borough. Id. at 375 n.3.
Furthermore the immunity of the borough is tangential to the issue of the
abrogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity raised in this Note and
will therefore not be discussed.
20. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949, 950 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
21. Union I, 792 F.2d at 375.
22. I&
23. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. at 952.
24. Union I, 792 F. 2d at 375.
25. Id at 383.
26. Union 11, 832 F.2d at 1346.
•27. SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657.
3
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opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of SARA.'
Upon remand, the Third Circuit concluded SARA provides CERCLA
with the clear language necessary to abrogate state sovereign immuni-
ty.30 Thus, the court had to address the constitutional issue of "the
power of Congress to abrogate the eleventh amendment not by the later
fourteenth amendment but by the commerce power of the earlier Article
I."' The Third Circuit found Congress had such power and the State
of Pennsylvania appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 2 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' and heard the case
in October of 1988.
II. PURPOSE OF CERCLA
CERCLA was a "bold effort to meet the threat to the public health
and environment posed by inactive hazardous waste sites."'' In 1979
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated there were
approximately thirtj to fifty thousand inactive and uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites in the United States.' Of these sites, approxi-
mately two thousand present a serious risk to the public health.3 The
current Solid Waste Disposal Act37 provided a "cradle-to-grave"
regulatory regime for the management of solid and hazardous wastes
and was designed specifically to prohibit the open dumping of such
wastes.38 But, as the EPA findings point out, the law was "clearly
inadequate" for dealing with the myriad of abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste sites.3 9  CERCLA initiates and establishes "a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control
the vast problems associated with.., hazardous waste disposal
sites."4  CERCLA provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous
29. United States v. Union Gas, 479 U.S. 1025 (1987).
30. Union I, 832 F.2d at 1345.
31. 1d.
32. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
33. Id.
34. Union I, 792 F.2d at 372.
35. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmI. NEWS 6119, 6120.
36. Id.
37. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,90
Stat. 2795.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 35, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADnm. NEWS 6119, 6120.
39. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119,
6119-20.
40. Id. at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119,
[Vol. 55
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waste sites, as well as imposing costs for remedial action on responsible
"personst41 and "owners and operators."42  CERCLA establishes a
Hazardous Waste Response Fund-hence the nickname
"Superfund"-for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites and provides
that the fund be replenished by "potentially responsible parties"
including current property owners, owners at the time of disposal,
people who arrange for disposal, past off-site generators, and even
certain transporters of a hazardous waste.43 It empowers the Presi-
dent to coordinate with states in which there is a hazardous waste site
emergency to clean-up the dangerous waste or prevent the danger from
escalating.' CERCLA further establishes regulations for inactive
hazardous waste sites, provides for a national inventory of such sites,
and establishes a program for appropriate environmental response
actions to protect the public health and environment.45
Just as CERCLA corrects the faults in the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, SARA supplements the inadequacies of CERCLA. In passing
CERCLA, Congress severely underestimated the number of abandoned
sites, as well as the cost and type of clean-up. 46 SARA provides an
additional ten billion dollars to clean up the nation's worst abandoned
sites. SARA also establishes national clean-up standards, a schedule for




The eleventh amendmente acts as a jurisdictional bar to suits
brought in the federal courts against state governments when suit is
brought by anyone other than the United States or another state.49
6125.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1980).
42. Id. § 9601(20).
43. Id. § 9607.
44. Union I, 792 F.2d. at 372.
45. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 35.
46. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 54, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2836.
47. Id.
48. The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
49. J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-55, § 2.11
5
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The bar applies to all types of suits for damages and retroactive relief,
but not to prospective injunctive relief requiring the state to comply
with federal law. ° The Supreme Court has construed the amendment
broadly to preclude even suits against a state by the state's own
citizens.51 The amendment does not prohibit a suit against the state
in state court. Whether a state is subject to suits in state court is
dependent on whether the state has waived its immunity.52
Eleventh amendment immunity can be abrogated in two exclusive,
alternative ways: (1) Congress can abrogate it statutorily by providing
for suits against states, or (2) states can waive their sovereign immunity
and consent to be sued.5 Congress may abrogate the state's immunity
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of a
statute.54 A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the
kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the
eleventh amendment.5 5  Congress has, through clear statutory
language and legislative intent, effectively enacted a number of laws
abrogating a state's immunity in federal court.
Accordingly, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,5" before reaching
the question of Congress's power of abrogation under the commerce
clause, the Court had to decide whether CERCLA, as amended by
SARA, clearly expresses an intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for
conduct described in the statute.5 The majority found CERCLA and
(1986) [hereinafter J. NowAK].
50. 1d.; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974), reh'g denied,
416 U.S. 1000 (1974).
51. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486
(1987) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
52. Boren, Suits Against States in Federal Court: The Current Eleventh
Amendment Controversy, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 701, 717 (1988).
53. Union 1, 832 F.2d at 1346; accord Welch, 483 U.S. at 478-88.
54. Welch, 483 U.S. at 471 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
55. Id. at 476.
56. United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. at 951; see also Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979) (Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act (1982)); McNabb v. United States Dep't of Educ.,
862 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 55 (1989) (Randolph
Shepperd Act); Witter v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard, 462 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act); Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F.
Supp. 296 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd in part, rev'd in part, 753 F.2d 1397 (1985)
(Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975)).
57. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
58. In Union I!the Third Circuit found that SARA demonstrated Congress'
unmistakable intent to subject the states to suit in federal court. Union 1I, 832
F.2d at 1347. In Union I, the Third Circuit found that CERCLA did not contain
562 [Vol. 55
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SARA contained the requisite intent. First, CERCLA explicitly included
states within its definition of "persons. ,59  Second, "owners and
operators" are defined by referring to certain activities that a "person"
may undertake.' Section 9601(20)(D) of SARA excludes from liability
states that are "owners and operators" when ownership or control was
"acquired involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandon-
the requisite congressional intent because 1) the suggestion that states might
be sued was found in a provision separate from the one that created the
plaintiff's cause of action, 2) § 9607(g) explicitly waives federal sovereign
immunity and there is no other similar provision referring to state sovereign
immunity, 3) § 9607(a) which Union gas claimed abrogated the eleventh
amendment has meaningful function regardless of Union Gas' interpretation-to
establish a cause of action by the United States against states that own or
operate hazardous waste sites, and 4) Congressional abrogation. Union I, 792
F.2d at 378-82. Otherwise the United States would be left with the problem of
suing each state under its own tort law. The Third Circuit also refuted Union
Gas' argument that Pennsylvania waived its immunity because the state's
"purchase and clean up efforts are not sufficiently emphatic to constitute a
constructive waiver of its constitutional right. It would be unreasonable to infer
from Pennsylvania's actions that it had waived one of its most important and
longstanding constitutional rights." Id at 376 n.5.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. IV 1986). The term "person" means an
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. Id.
60. Id. § 9601(20)(A), (D). Subsection A provides:
The term "owner or operator" means... in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and.., in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such
facility immediately beforehand.
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local
government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily
through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other
circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by
virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this
paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local
government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the
same manner and to same extent, both procedurally and substantive-
ly, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section
9607 of this title.
7
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ment;" or other situations in which the state acquires title by virtue of
its sovereign function.6' SARA also states that the exclusion it
provides shall not apply "to any state or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance."'62 Furthermore, such a state or local government shall
be subject to the provisions of this Act (CEROLA as amended by SARA)
in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity, including liability under section 9607.' SARA's express
exclusion from liability of states who acquire ownership involuntarily
would not be necessary unless Congress intended states, as owners and
operators, to be liable along with everyone else for clean-up costs
recoverable under the statute.6 CERCLA further provides that states
shall not be liable for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in
response to emergency situations at facilities owned by another unless
the state responds with gross negligence or intentional misconduct. 5
Again, the majority opinion, as written by Justice Brennan, contended
that Congress need not exempt states from liability unless they would
otherwise be liable. Similarly, section 9659(a)(1)' states that citizen
suits can be brought against any person-including the United States
and any other governmental agency. As a result, these citizen suits
would be unnecessary if Congress had not specifically overridden the
state's immunity from suit elsewhere in the statute. 7 Finally, the
Court placed great emphasis on the SARA language describing the
potential liability of the states. This language basically tracked the




64. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278 (1989).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1987).
66. Id. § 9659. Citizens suits
(a) Authority to bring civil actions
Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section and
in section 9613(h) of this title (relating to timing of judicial review),
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be
in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or
order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter (including
any provision of an agreement under section 9620 of this title, relating
to Federal facilities) ....
I.
67. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
[Vol. 55
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from suit.' The majority further rejected Pennsylvania's and the
dissent's proposition that SARA meant to make states liable in
enforcement actions brought by the federal government and not by
private citizens. The majority reasoned that if CERCLA did not subject
the states to suit by private citizens, then the last sentence of section
9601(20)(D)-"to the same extent as any non-governmental entity,
including liability under section 9607"-would have no meaning.69
Section 9607 provides for liability in damages; a special remedy
requiring special statutory language when the state's immunity from
suits by private citizens is involved. In light of section 9601(20)(D)'s
"very precise language, it would be exceedingly odd to interpret this
provision as merely a signal that the United States-rather than private
citizens-could sue the states for damages under CERCLA."0° Like the
Third Circuit in Union II, a majority of the Union Gas Court found that
in CERCLA, as amended by SARA, Congress demonstrated its specific
contemplation of the states' position in the constitutional scheme and
chose to make them liable to suit by individuals in federal court.7'
In his concurring opinion, Justice White found no "unmistakably
clear language.., that expresses Congress's intent to abrogate the
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity." 2 Justice White found the
significance which the majority placed on CERCLA's inclusion of states
within its definition of "persons" as "suspect."73  In Justice White's
view, such significance placed on this definitional section would render
68. Id Compare § 9601(20)(D) with § 9620(a)(1). For text of § 9601(20)(D),
see supra note 60.
§ 9620. Federal facilities
(a) Application of chapter to Federal Government
(1) In general
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
Stats (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substan-
tively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
section 9607 of this title. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to affect the liability of any person or entity under sections 9606 and
9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1987).
69. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
70. Id. at 2230.
71. Id. at : Union II, 832 F.2d. at 1348.
72. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2289 (White, J., concurring). Justice White
was joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice
Kennedy.
73. Id at 2290.
9
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other sections of the statute "wholly redundant."'74  Justice White
explained that the definitional section also includes the "United States
Government" within the term "persons." If this definitional section was
sufficient, then section 9607(g), which renders the federal government
subject to suit under the statutes' liability provisions, would be
superfluous and redundant. Instead, Justice White reasoned that
Congress did not think that including the United States Government or
the states within the definition of "persons" would be sufficient to
abrogate one or the other's sovereign immunity. Yet, the majority never
stated that the inclusion of states within the term "persons" was
sufficient by itself, to abrogate their sovereign immunity." The
majority looked at the combined provisions of CEROLA and SARA.
Justice White vehemently objected to this combination analysis. This
analysis lost sight of the "underlying theory behind" the Court's cases,
"undermine[d]" the Court's precedents, and made "this difficult case
artificially easier."76 Instead of the combination analysis used by the
majority, Justice White looked at CERCLA and SARA independently of
each other. In his view, there were three options: 1) Congress abrogated
state sovereign immunity when it enacted CERCLA (in which case
section 9607(g) would be redundant); 2) Congress did not abrogate
sovereign immunity until it adopted SARA; or 3) Congress did not have
an intent to abrogate in either instance." Justice White chose to
believe the last of these three possibilities.
Secondly, Justice White stated the portion of CERCLA on which the
majority relied and the portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
on which the Court previously relied in Employees v. Missouri Depart-
ment of Public Health and Welfare78 are in all relevant respects
"indistinguishable."7 9 In Employees, the Court concluded that the
relevant statutory term that described who was covered by the Act
included the states as employers. The Court, however, found congressio-
nal intent to make states subject to enforcement actions brought by the
federal government only; not actions brought by private litigants.80
Using the same rationale, Justice White concluded Congress intended
the states to be liable to enforcement actions brought only by the federal
government. Like CERCLA, the FLSA was designed to be "comprehen-
sive in nature."8' Therefore, the Court's previous policy finding of the
74. Id.
75. Id- at 2279.
76. Id. at 2290 n.1.
77. Id.
78. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
79. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2291.
80. Employees, 411 U.S. at 286.
81. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2291.
[Vol. 55
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FLSA, as far as the states are concerned, "is wholly served by allowing
the delicate federal-state relationship to be managed through enforce-
ment actions directed by [the federal government]-and not through
litigation by private parties against the states."8 2  By the same
analysis, states subjected to enforcement actions brought by the federal
government is a vinble means to achieve CERCLA's ends.'
Next, Justice White rejected the majority's interpretation of section
9601(20)(D), making states that have involuntarily acquired ownership
of the property liable in so far as they cause or contribute to the release
of a hazardous substance.' Justice White believed section 9601(20)(D)
was enacted solely as a limitation on governmental unit liability. Under
limited circumstances, state governments "will be forced to pay" the
federal government for clean-ups at involuntarily-acquired sites.8 By
rejecting Justice White's interpretation that section 9601(20)(D) limited
the liability of states who involuntarily acquired ownership only to the
federal government, the majority was left to "contort" the section to read
as "an implicit statement that elsewhere the eleventh amendment has
been waived for private law suits."' 6
Finally, Justice White rejected the majority's view that the last
sentence of section 9601(20)(D)-making states who acquire ownership
involuntarily and who cause a release of hazardous chemicals, liable to
the same extent as any non-governmental entity-provides a clear
abrogation of immunity. Instead, Justice White said this provision
exists to make states liable to the federal government.8 7 Justice White
agreed with the majority that no statutory provision is necessary to
permit the United States to sue a state. Section 9601(20)(D), however,
expressly forbids such suits against states that are involuntary owners.
Therefore, the last sentence "operates to put some states back into the
class of entities that may be liable to the United States, after Congress
had previously exempted them from such actions."'  This interpreta-
tion of SARA is consistent with the Court's previous interpretation of a
similar section of the FLSA in Employees.89 Justice White believed
Congress may have added this phrase ("as any nongovernmental
entity"), as a statutory exclamation point to emphasize that states which
are involuntary owners, which actually cause subsequent discharges,
should be liable under the statute, regardless of their involuntary owner
82. Id. (citing Employees, 411 U.S. at 286).
83. Id
84. Id. at 2292. For text of § 9601(20)(D), see supra note 59.
85. Id-
86. Id at 2292 & n.4.
87. Id at 2293-94.
88. Id. at 2294.
89. Id at 2293.
11
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status, when the United States seeks recovery.' Second, Justice
White speculated that Congress added the phrase so that local
governments that cause discharges at involuntarily-acquired sites would
be liable regardless of any state-law immunity doctrines for such local
governmental entities. Justice White concluded that "it is incongruous
to attribute such sweeping significance-an eleventh amendment
abrogation... -to this one phrase in the definitional portion of
SARA/CERCLA."9' Even if the majority's interpretation of section
9601(20)0)) was itself "reasonable," the existence of an alternative non-
abrogation "reasonable" interpretation of the section dictates a rejection
of the majority's conclusion that CEROLA, as amended by SARA,
contains an unmistakably clear statement of Congressional intent to
abrogate.2
In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority's
interpretation of CERCLA and SARA.9" He stated Justice White was
"perhaps correct" if one assumes the purpose of the Court is to "plumb
the intent of the particular Congress that enacted a particular provi-
sion. 0 4 Rather, the purpose of the Court, in the eyes of Justice Scalia,
is to give "fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States
Code" and not to enter the "minds of the Members of Congress-who
need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be lawful and
effective."9" Whether it was CERCLA or SARA that "envisioned" that
states are liable to private persons for money damages is irrelevant to
Justice Scalia. He stated, "The law does" render states liable in private
suits.9
8
The language of section 9659 of CERCLA, on which the majority
based its finding that Congress intended civil actions against the
individual states, is similar, if not identical in certain paragraphs, to the
language used in at least eleven other federal environmental statutes.
The Clean Air Act states that "any person may commence a civil
action... against any person including (i) the United States and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution... against
the Administrator," or against any person who proposes to construct or
modify a major emitting facility." Unlike CERCLA, the Clean Air Act
and the other eleven federal environmental statutes continue to state
90. Id at 2294 n.6.
91. Id
92. Id. at 2294.
93. Id at 2295.
94. Id. at 2296.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Air Pollution Prevention and Control, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642 (1982).
[Vol. 55
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that no action may be commenced until sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the violation to the Administrator, the state where the
violation occurs, and to any alleged violator.' The other federal
environmental statutes with similar language allowing for citizen suits
are: the Toxic Substances Control Act,' the Endangered Species
Act,' °° the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,101
the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, °2 the Public Health
Service Act' ° and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.13 4
One environmental law textbook notes that under the Clean Air Act, the
potential for citizen-initiated enforcement against individual polluters
has not been realized. 0 5  The authors believe that the national
environmental groups prefer to challenge the Environmental Protection
Agency's rules and standards which are applied broadly across the
nation, rather than enforce specific standards at the local level.1°6
This rationale, of preferring to challenge national standards, is what
distinguishes citizen suits against the states under these other federal
environmental statutes from citizen suits brought pursuant to CERCLA.
Suits under these other statutes are designed to force a state to comply
with standards already established by the federal agencies or by the
states themselves. The purpose is for such suits to seek prospective
relief, which is clearly allowed by the Constitution.0 7 Furthermore,
when these standards or policies were set, the states had several
opportunities to voice their objections to the administrative body. But,
citizen suits brought under CERCLA are designed to seek immediate
monetary damages against a state for the cost of cleaning up a
hazardous waste site. The plaintiff is not seeking necessarily to force
a state into compliance, rather he is seeking the cost of clean-up for an
individual site. Such relief may amount to a suit for retroactive relief.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1982).
101. 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982).
105. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTEOTIoN: LAW AND PoLICY 151 (1984).
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
13
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IV. HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment was passed in reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.'"s Chisholm was an original
action in assumpsit, filed by the executor of a South Carolina estate, to
recover money owed to the estate by the state of Georgia.' 9 The
deceased, Robert Faquar, had furnished supplies during the Revolution-
ary War to Georgia pursuant to a contract."0  Georgia did not deny
the debt; it just refused to appear on the ground that the federal court
had no jurisdiction.' In a four to one decision, the Court decided it
had jurisdiction pursuant to article III, section 2 of the Constitution. 1 2
In writing their opinions seriatim, the four justices who voted togeth-
er 1 rested their decision on article III and the states having limited
sovereignty in a national democracy, rather than a congressional grant
of jurisdiction.14  Five years later the eleventh amendment was
ratified." 5  Its language has been construed to mean that courts
cannot, pursuant to their article III powers, subject states to suit.110
Because Chisholm was an action in assumpsit-a state law cause
of action-scholars have argued that the eleventh amendment was
intended to reach only cases of diversity jurisdiction."' This view is
108. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
109. Id
110. Boren, supra note 52, at 704.
111. J. NOWAK, supra note 49, at 47.
112. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,473-80 (1793). Article III, §
2 states:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; -to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies between
two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -
between Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
113. Justices Blair, Wilson, Cushing, and Jay.
114. J. NOWAK, supra note 49, at 47.
115. Boren, supra note 52, at 706.
116. Union I, 832 F.2d at 1353.
117. Union I, 832 F.2d at 1353 n.8. But see Boren, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 701,
713 (1988) ("Based upon this evidence, a cogent argument can be made that the
[Vol. 55
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expressed clearly in the dissenting opinion of Welch v. Texas.18 The
dissenters believed a suit brought by an individual under a federal law
against a state is not barred by the eleventh amendment." 9 The
dissenters' view of the amendment is merely an academic argument in
light of the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Hans v. Louisi-
ana1" in which the Court held the eleventh amendment bar included
federal question jurisdiction. Hans has been consistently upheld"
and even referred to as one of the most stable principles in constitution-
al jurisprudence." The Court in Welch stated that federal question
actions are "unquestionably" suits in "law or equity" and are, thus,
within the plain language of the amendment. 12 After Hans, the
Court expanded the reach of the eleventh amendment to include suits
in admiralty and suits by foreign sovereigns.'2 Thus, the eleventh
amendment embodies the constitutional foundation of state sovereign
immunity 2 5
amendment was very limited in its scope and was not intended to apply to
federal question cases."). Boren looked at such evidence as the debates of state
conventions including the views of Alexander Hamilton and John Hamilton, as
well as the limited wording of the amendment especially in light of the
expressions of the four majority justices in Chisholm that the defense of
sovereign immunity did not exist under the Constitution.
118. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). In Welch an employee of the Texan Highways
Department was injured while working on a ferry dock operated by the
department. The employee filed suit against the department and the state
under § 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), which in effect applies
remedial provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act. The district court
dismissed the suit as barred by the eleventh amendment and the Supreme court
affirmed. Welch v. Texas, 483 U.S. 468,471-72 (1987). Like CERCLA, FLSA
was passed by Congress pursuant to the commerce clause. The court also stated
that an action under the Jones Act unquestionably is an action to recover
damages from the state. Id. at 475.
119. Id. at 497. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice
Brennan in his dissent which stated that the eleventh amendment only applies
to diversity suits and not suits based on federal questions. They reach this
opinion because of the parallels between article III and the eleventh amend-
ment.
120. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
121. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
122. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 486.
123. Id. at 485.
124. Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLuM. L. REV.
1022, 1026 (1988).
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V. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In a question of state sovereign immunity, finding congressional
intent is only the first question the Court must address. Upon finding
congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity, the
Court must then decide whether the commerce clause' 2  grants
Congress such power." The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly
that the fourteenth amendment grants Congress the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.'" CERCLA was enacted, however,
pursuant to Congress's article I commerce clause powers.1 The
Supreme Court either has expressly reserved the question whether
Congress has this power under article I" or assumed, "without
deciding or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of
Congress to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal court is not
confined to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.', 13 1 In Welch, the
Supreme Court stated that an argument for "such authority" starts from
the proposition that the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate
matters within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, either under the
commerce clause or the necessary and proper clause. 32 By ratifying
the Constitution, the states necessarily consented to suit in federal court
with respect to enactments under either clause.'3 The Court in Welch
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, col. 3. The commerce clause says "[Tihe
Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...
I&.
127. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295. The third part of Justice Brennan's
opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice White
joined in the result but "disagreed with much of the reasoning." Id.
128. Union II, 832 F.2d. at 1351 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)).
129. Id
130. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985).
Indian tribes brought action in federal district court alleging their ancestors
conveyed tribal land to New York State under a 1975 agreement that violated
the Nonintercourse Act of 1793 which required United States' approval for the
purchase of Indian land. The district court found for the Indians, awarded
damages and held that New York must indemnify the relevant counties for these
damages. The Supreme Court affirmed everything below except the ancillary
jurisdiction over New York.
131. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court did not need to reach the
constitutional argument because they did not find the requisite clear Congressio-
nal intent to abrogate under the Jones Act.
132. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475 n.5.
133. Id at 475 n.5. The Court continued to state that they had "no occasion
to consider" the validity of the additional holding in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
[Vol. 55572
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did not have to reach this decision because "Congress [did] not express
in unmistakable statutory language its intention to allow States to be
sued in federal court under the Jones Act."'1
This is the first argument put forth by Justice Brennan to support
the Court's holding that Congress has the power to abrogate pursuant
to the commerce clause.1" This was also one of the main reasons
behind the Third Circuit's holding in Union I 1 ' These opinions
reason that "participation of the states in our federal scheme has
resulted in a relinquishment of state authority in the commerce
area. 1 37  Congressional authority over interstate commerce stems
from the plenary powers that have been granted to the national
legislature and represents a displacement of state sovereignty.1' 8
Prohibiting congressional power to abrogate under article I would ignore
the states' representation in Congress and the states' consent to
diminished power implicit in their acceptance of the Constitution.
139
Hence, what the Supreme Court has given the states through
interpretations of the eleventh amendment is circumscribed by the
states' acceptance of the principle of federalism embodied in the
Constitution. The sovereign immunity of the eleventh amendment
forms a presumption that the states may not be sued. This presump-
tion may be refuted by acts of Congress.' 4°
U.S. 184 (1964), that Congress has the power to abrogate a state's eleventh
amendment immunity under the commerce clause to the extent states are
engaged in interstate commerce. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 n.8. In Parden a state
was held to have impliedly waived its privilege of sovereign immunity where it
voluntarily operated a federally regulated railway for profit. Richard Anderson
Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 1988). The precedential
value of Parden has been extremely narrowed and to the extent the decision is
inconsistent with the requirement that abrogation of eleventh amendmentimmunity must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it has been
overruled. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
134. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
135. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281.
136. Union H, 832 F.2d at 1355.
137. Id. at 1356.
138. I&
139. 1L at 1355.
140. Brown, 852 F.2d at 125 (Boyle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). The majority in Brown decided that Congress did not have the requisite
clear intent to abrogate state immunity in the language of the federal Copyright
Act which was passed pursuant to the commerce clause. Justice Boyle believed
the act contained the necessary clear intent and continued to state that
Congress had the power to abrogate pursuant to article I. Id
17
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Article I envisions national government with exclusive power to regulate
certain subjects, when such regulation would serve the nation's
interests.' 4 ' Allowing a state to avoid such national control by raising
the defense of sovereign immunity would be inconsistent with the
constitutional plan.' In Union Gas, the plurality of the Court stated,
it is "no accident that every appeals court to have reached this issue has
concluded that Congress has the authority to abrogate state's immunity
from suit when legislating pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by
the Constitution.' 14' Even if the Court had never before discussed the
specific connection between congressional authority under the commerce
clause and state's immunity from suit, "careful regard for precedent still
would mandate the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate
immunity when exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate
commerce.144
The plurality reasoned that the states gave their consent to be held
liable in ratifying the Constitution containing the commerce clause,
rather than consenting on a case-by-case basis.
145
[Congressional power] conferred under the commerce clause would be
incomplete without the authority to render states liable in damages
it must be that, to the extent that the states gave Congress the
authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity
where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to
render them liable."
The vastness of the commerce clause is not important. Rather the
importance of the clause is its effect on the powers of the states. The
Court has consistently held the commerce clause powers displace state
authority even when Congress has chosen not to act.
147
The Supreme Court has allowed federal court jurisdiction against
unconsenting states when brought by sister states, by the United States,
or under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 4 s The plurality
believed when Congress acts pursuant to section 5, it is exercising
legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitution-
141. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and
Regulations: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARv. L. REv. 682, 694 (1976).
142. Id.
143. 109 S. Ct. at 2281 (citations omitted).
144. Id at 2282.
145. Id. at 2284.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Welch, 483 U.S. at 474; see also Tribe, supra note 141.
[Vol. 55
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al grant. "[lit is exercising that authority under one section of a
constitutional amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority. 14 9 In so reasoning, the Court
"emphasized the 'shift in the federal-state balance' occasioned by the
Civil War Amendments.I" ° Justice Brennan further argued the same
reasoning used by the Court to allow congressional abrogation under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is "as applicable to Commerce
Clause."''1 Like the fourteenth amendment, the commerce clause
gives power to Congress while it takes power away from the states.
Every addition of power to the federal government involves a corre-
sponding diminution of the governmental powers of the states. A state
cannot deny to the federal government the right to exercise all its
granted powers, even though the exercise of such powers may interfere
with the full enjoyment of rights to which the state may otherwise have
been entitled. 52 This expansion of federal power and contraction of
state power "is the meaning, in fact, of a 'plenary' grant of authori-
ty."" It makes no sense to conceive of section 5 as somehow being an
"ultraplenary" grant of power.
T5
The plurality rejected the argument that Congress can abrogate
only under those amendments passed after the eleventh amendment.
Deciding precisely what actions the Constitution does or does not
authorize to Congress is a problem in itself. Like the plurality, the
Union II court interpreted the provisions of the Constitution as an
entire document and not on a "time line."'55 "The Constitution of the
United States, with the several amendments thereof, must be regarded
as one instrument, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal
validity."'" The Union H court continued by saying the Constitution
is not "self destructive" in that the powers it grants in one section (such
as the power to regulate interstate commerce), it does not immediately
take away on the other hand. 57 "It would be a fragile Constitution
indeed if subsequent amendments could, without express reference, be
interpreted to wipe out the original understanding of Congressional
Power."',
149. 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)).
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Union I, 832 F.2d. at 1351.
156. Id. at 1351 (citations omitted).
157. Id
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Lower courts have said Congress can only waive eleventh amend-
ment immunity in legislation passed pursuant to amendments ratified
with full awareness of the eleventh amendment.'5 9 So as the eleventh
amendment limits article III jurisdiction, so does the fourteenth
amendment limit eleventh amendment immunity." o Evidently these
amendments passed after the eleventh amendment were designed
specifically to expand federal power and to provide Congress with the
authority to implement these powers through the federal judiciary. 10 '
To further this argument, proponents have narrowly interpreted the
precedential value of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer'7-availability of retroac-
tive money damages when legislating under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment-as being the only area where Congress has such power.
Yet the fourteenth amendment, unlike the conmerce clause,
protects individual rights from the state. Because of the importance of
such individual rights, an argument can be made that Congress wanted
to allow explicitly for federal causes of action to protect these rights for
individuals. Granting the power to create causes of action in these post
civil war amendments, however, does not mean Congress is prohibited
from using the powers granted in other provisions of the constitution to
abrogate sovereign immunity.'(
Next, the majority stated the language of the eleventh amendment
gives "no hint that it limits congressional authority;" it refers only to the
"judicial power" and forbids construing that power to extend to the
enumerated suits.'6 This language was "plainly intended to rein in
159. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 11, Commonwealth v.
Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1241).
160. Id at 10.
161. Id. at 11. Other post civil war amendments which grant individuals
protection against the states and provide for congressional abrogation are the
thirteenth which abolishes slavery, the fifteenth which concerns the right to
vote, the nineteenth which concerns women's suffrage and the twenty-fourth
which prohibits poll taxes. Id, at 11 n.13.
162. 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
163. Justice Scalia rejects this argument in his dissent by stating that when
the court has considered whether a surrender of state immunity is inherent in
the plan of the convention they have done so under the rubric of the various
grants of jurisdiction in Article III. The Court has never "gone thumbing
through the Constitution, to see what other original grants of authority-as
opposed to Amendments adopted after the Eleventh Amendment-might justify
elimination of state sovereign immunity." 109 S. Ct. at 2300-01.
164. Id at 2282-83. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the arguments of the State of Pennsylvania that the eleventh
amendment restricts both federal judiciary and congressional powers.
Proponents of Pennsylvania's interpretation of the eleventh amendment argue
[Vol. 55
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the judiciary, not Congress."'5 The eleventh amendment "was
intended as a limitation on judicial, not congressional power."'" It
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts as originally constructed under
article III and affirmed in Chisholm16 7 The Third Circuit stated "the
language of the [eleventh] amendment does not, nor was it ever
intended to, limit Congress' Article [sic] I powers; rather, it limits the
courts' power to construe the grant of judicial power in Article [sic] III
to abrogate the state's presumptive immunity from diversity suits.'
168
Thus the eleventh amendment was intended as a limitation on judicial,
not congressional power.
1 9
The Supreme Court cases, which have construed the eleventh
amendment broadly to prohibit a federal question suit against a state
by its own citizens, limit the ability of an individual to receive damages
from the illegal acts of a stateY0 These cases restrict the ability of
the federal judiciary to grant relief but they do not necessarily address
the different problem of whether Congress has the power to create a
federal cause of action against the states. 71 In other words, conclud-
ing that neither article III nor the Judiciary Act of 1879 automatically
eliminate sovereign immunity does not begin to address the question
whether "other Congressional enactments, not designed simply to
that construing the eleventh amendment as only curtailing power of the
judiciary is an incorrect use of the words "judicial power." The words "judicial
power" in Article III have been understood as placing an outer limit on federal
court jurisdiction and "implicitly prohibiting" Congress from granting jurisdic-
tion to the federal court beyond its powers. Therefore limitations on article III
judicial power are limitations on the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction.
The Constitution does not authorize Congress to extend the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond that which they are expressly prohibited from considering.
However such an interpretation of the eleventh amendment is inconsistent with
the view espoused by the Supreme Court in Welch.
165. Id. at 2283.
166. Union H, 832 F.2d at 1353 n.8.
167. Brown, 852 F.2d at 125. "Congressional abrogation does not refer to
an impermissible attempt to override an constitutional guarantee by a statutory
decree." Id. Rather it refers to the ability of Congress to create a cause of action
for money damages enforceable by a citizen suit against a state in federal court.
Union II, 832 F.2d at 1345 n.1.
168. Union I, 832 F.2d at 1353.
169. Id. at 1353 n.8.
170. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1975).
171. Id. at 1415.
21
Noyes: Noyes: Superfund
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
implement Article IIrs grants of jurisdiction, may override State's
immunity.' 17
2
The rationale behind the view that the eleventh amendment is a
limitation on judicial and not congressional power is that Congress is
accountable to both the state and federal systems. 73  In contrast, to
maintain our system of checks and balances, the federal judiciary, which
is isolated from the political pressures of re-election and the influences
of the states, should be constrained from abrogating state sovereign
immunity.' 74 Congress, which feels direct pressure from the states,
will be inclined to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity only in those
instances where the benefits clearly outweigh any detrimental effect on
the states. A congressional grant of jurisdiction, allowing individual
suits against a state, indicates Congress has determined that federal
policy is preeminent and the hardship on the state is not severe.
1 6
If the states do not like the regulation, they can exert their influence to
have the legislation changed."6 Conversely, the states practically
have no recourse when there has been judicial assumption of jurisdiction
over a state.17  Construing the eleventh amendment as a restriction
on federal jurisdiction creates a constitutional restriction on the federal
courts and maintains a vital balance. Allowing Congress to abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its plenary article I powers will
not upset this vital balance of our tripartite system. The states are
represented in Congress which will be attentive to the state's needs as
sovereigns, separate from the federal government.' 8 Because the
delegates in Congress will respond to state's needs, ignoring clear
congressional intent to abrogate will "thwart the Constitution's plan by
ignoring the representative nature of Congress."'
17 9
The significance of the eleventh amendment lies in its affirmation
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant
of judicial authority in article III."s The contours of state sovereignimmunity, which is vital to the federal system, are determined by the
structure and requirements of the system itself.'8' The language of
the eleventh amendment does not mention sovereign immunity,
172. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct: at 2283.
173. Nowak, supra note 170, at 1441.




178. Tribe, supra note 141, at 695.
179. Union II, 832 F.2d at 1355.
180. Welch, 483 U.S. at 472 (citing Penhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)).
181. See id. at 472-74.
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therefore, the judicial interpretation arising from the amendment must
"by its nature" be less powerful than the sovereign immunity the states
originally gave up when they ratified the Constitution." 2 Constitu-
tional law scholar and legal professor John E. Nowak believes that this
interpretation of the eleventh amendment, as espoused by the plurality,
supports the intentions of those who originally ratified the Constitu-
tion."s  After analyzing the arguments raised at the Ratification
Convention, Nowak concludes that even though not explicitly stated, the
federalists believed Congress could grant federal court jurisdiction in
suits against states, but they disclaimed any "inherent power of the
judiciary to assume such jurisdictiom' 184 Nowak further contends the
apparent inconsistencies in the interpretations of the Ratification
Convention can be reconciled by recognizing that opposition to article III
was based on the fear that federal judges, who are tenured for life,
would assume jurisdiction over these states and subject unconsenting
states to suit."s  None of the attacks on article III were directed at
congressional grants of jurisdiction to federal courts. The confusion
surrounding the eleventh amendment results from the failure of courts
and commentators to draw the distinction between congressional power
to create a private federal cause of action against the states, and the
judicial power to imply such a cause of action.'l 6
"Laws enacted under the commerce power may sometimes interfere
with local activities, but the creation of federal causes of actions against
the states always involves the disruption of state activities by federal
policies."'8 7  These federal intrusions into state affairs must meet a
heavy burden of justification.188 Requiring a statement of clear
congressional intent before Congress may override eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity assures that congressional intent-thus state
interests-will be followed. 89 The requirement of clear congressional
intent also ensures that attempts to limit state power are unmistakable.
This allows the legislative process to protect the state's interests and to
182. Brown, 852 F.2d at 125.
183. Nowak, supra note 170, at 1464. Although Professor Nowak may agree
with the majority that Congress has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity
when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause, he does not agree that a
retroactive cause of action for damages would be permissible even if created
pursuant to congressional power in the fourteenth amendment. Id.
184. Id. at 1430.
185. Id. at 1428-30.
186. Id. at 1414.
187. Id. at 1442.
188. Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of
History, 18 THE URB. LAWYER 519, 547 (1986).
189. Union 1I, 832 F.2d at 1355.
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check judicial interpretation of statutes.19°  Congress is checked
further in that any congressional attempt to "confer jurisdiction and
abrogate immunity must be reasonably ancillary to an otherwise valid
substantive exercise of federal lawmaking power" and may not violate
the tenth amendment by exercising its power in a way that impairs the
state's integrity or ability to function effectively.'
9
'
The most far reaching result of Union Gas is the plurality's holding
that "federal legislation under the commerce power must include the
power to hold States financially accountable not only to the Federal
Government, but to private citizens as well."'" Until this case, past
Supreme Court decisions espoused the view that the eleventh amend-
ment barred actions for damages, for past debts, or for retroactive relief
of any type.'93 In Edelman v. Jordan,"94 the Court held that a suit
by private parties seeking to impose a liability payable from public
funds was foreclosed by the eleventh amendment."' The amendment
has served as a "strict limitation" on federal courts to hear actions
against a state government for money damages. Its basic purpose,
according to the Supreme Court in Ex parte 'Young,'9 was to prevent
disruption of state treasuries by retroactive relief.197 Even so, the
Court in Ex parte Young upheld prospective relief by a federal court
even if it involved the use of state funds.'9 One of the major purposes
of the amendment was to prevent undue burdens upon the state
treasuries. Money damages are special because of their effect on the
functions of state government and because they create a high degree of
federal intrusion.19 A strong state government is one that is fiscally
autonomous. 2°°  The awarding of monetary relief against states'
treasuries subjects them to a much higher degree of federal interference
than other types of relief.20 A Congress free to create damage actions
190. Tribe, supra note 141, at 695.
191. Id at 697.
192. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
193. J. NowAK, supra note 49, at 50, § 2.1.
194. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
195. Id at 663. The Court stated that the funds to satisfy the plaintiff's
award of past due welfare payments must inevitably come from the general
revenues of the State. Thus the award closely resembles a monetary award
against the state itself, an award barred by the eleventh amendment. Id at
663-65.
196. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
197. Nowak, supra note 170, at 1421.
198. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
199. Note, supra note 124, at 1045.
200. Id. at 1047.
201. Id. at 1048.
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against the states under any article I power would be able to effect
significant redistributions out of the state treasuries. °
The plurality state'd, however, that "a conclusion that Congress may
not create a cause of action for money damages against the States would
mean that no one could do so. And in many situations, it is only money
damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the
Commerce Clause."m  Justice Brennan explained the general problem
of environmental harm is often not susceptible to local solutions;
therefore, the states must look to the federal government for environ-
mental solutions.' For these federal solutions to be satisfactory, they
"must include a cause of action for money damages."' ° 5 CERCLA
came about after Congress tried to solve the problems of hazardous
substances through other means. Justice Brennan opined that prior
statutes (such as the Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act of 1976)
failed because it focused on preventive measures to the exclusion of
remedial ones.' With CERCLA, Congress did not think it enough to
allow just the federal government to recoup clean-up costs. Congress
sought to encourage private parties to voluntarily clean-up hazardous
waste sites by allowing them to recover a proportionate amount of the
clean-up costs from other potentially responsible parties.207  The
Union Gas plurality concluded that "[i]f States, which comprise a
significant class of owners and operators of hazardous-waste sites ....
need not pay for costs of clean-up, the overall effect on voluntary clean-
ups [would] be substantial."'
Because state actions, such as those of Pennsylvania in the case at
bar, will have occurred before the explicit announcement of the federal
policy, the states will not have planned their finances to provide for
such liabilities.' Allowing retroactive abrogation defeats the
purposes of requiring clear congressional intent before allowing a suit
against a state. Clear intent is necessary to put the states on notice
that they may be liable for failure to conform so they can plan their
budgets and actions accordingly. Requiring clear congressional intent
"has enabled states to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation.
210
202. Id.
203. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284.
204. Id at 2284-85.




209. Brief of Amic! Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13,
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2273 (No. 87-1241).
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Pennsylvania was involved with the Brodhead Creek site years
before the enactment of SARA. The excavation which uncovered the
coal tar took place in 1980, six years before SARA. The state clearly
had no notice that it might be liable to a private party for approximate-
ly $720,000 worth of clean-up costs. 2 11 Had the state known of its
potential for liability, it could have conducted extensive environmental
studies before deciding whether to purchase the easements. A state will
now have to be as cautious as a private purchaser when acquiring
property-even an easement. Such a broad retroactive abrogation in a
suit for damages will destroy the constitutional protections the Supreme
Court has carefully preserved. A policy against retroactive damages
when Congress may otherwise abrogate sovereign immunity would be
more predictable and less burdensome on the states.212
The decision of the plurality fails to discuss the distinction between
retroactive and prospective relief. Furthermore, the Court failed to even
acknowledge, much less distinguish, its past holdings in Edelman v.
Jordan and Ex parte Young. 13 Instead, a plurality of the Court
expanded congressional power to not only abrogate sovereign immunity
under the commerce clause, but also to create suits by private parties
for monetary damages against the states. The only reasoning the Court
gave for the expansion of relief available to private parties was that
money damages are the "only" means to carry out Congress's objectives
under the commerce clause. 214
The Third Circuit also misconstrued the importance and devastat-
ing effect of retroactively applying a cause of action for damages against
the states. It addressed the issue in a footnote saying that in the
absence of an eleventh amendment problem, it need not distinguish
between the court's powers to grant retroactive or prospective relief
because "either or both may be appropriate."215 In light of the Courts
holding, one is left to ponder what effect legislation passed pursuant to
the commerce clause, and which now may allow for retroactive damages,
will have on past decisions of the Court.21
1, 17 (1981)).
211. Clearly the United States could have sought indemnification from the
state of Pennsylvania if they felt the state was partially responsible for the
release of the coal tar into Brodhead Creek. Instead, the United States
reimbursed the state for the costs the state incurred in cleaning up the creek.
212. Note, supra note 124, at 1048.
213. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
214. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284-85.
215. Union II, 832 F.2d at 1356 n.10.
216. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (federal suit to order
payment of illegally withheld welfare payments is barred by the eleventh
amendment); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459
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Furthermore, the Court's conclusion that, if state owners and
operators are not held liable to private parties for clean-up costs there
will be a substantial negative effect on voluntary clean-ups, is misplaced
as to the facts of this case. Such an argument would be valid if the
Union Gas Co. had voluntarily cleaned up Brodhead Creek and was now
asking for a proportionate share of the costs from the state. Union Gas
was more than happy to stand back and let the state and federal
government clean up the site. Union Gas sought recoupment from the
state only after the federal government sought to make them pay for the
complete cost of the clean up. CERCLA provided no "encouragement"
or incentive to Union Gas Co. to voluntarily clean up the site. In this
respect, Union Gas is fortunate that it had buried its toxic wastes in the
area the state later acquired as an easement. Otherwise, this case
would have never come into existence.
The plurality concluded by stating it does not follow from the
holding that "Congress, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce
Clause, could authorize suits in federal court that the bare terms of
Article III would not permit.""' The Court has never held that article
III does not permit any suit for damages brought by private citizens
when the states have consented to such suits. The majority reasoned
the states consented to such suits by approving the commerce pow-
er. 1' Even if this consent was not present, the majority would still
reject Pennsylvania's limitations on article III-that it applies only to
suits for damages when the state has consented. To hold otherwise
would leave the Court's previous holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitze&'9 to
" mean that the Fourteenth Amendment, though silent on the subject,"
expanded or changed the scope of article III.' Thus, the judgment
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opin-
ion .2
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens felt the need to "emphasize the
distinction between our two Eleventh Amendments."'  First, there
is the literal interpretation of the plain language of the eleventh
amendment-that the federal judicial power does not extend to diversity
actions against the states. Second, there is the judicially created
doctrine of sovereign immunity that the Court has added to the text of
(1945) (federal law suit for returning improperly collected state taxes is barred
by the eleventh amendment).
217. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
218. Id.
219. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
220. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
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the amendment. 223 As to the former, Stevens believed that Congress
does not have the power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the
commerce clause, or under any other provision of the Constitution,
because a statute cannot amend the Constitution.m As to the
judicially created doctrine of state immunity, however, Justice Stevens
agreed that Congress has plenary power to subject the states to suit in
federal court.225 Justice Stevens explained that in any "actual"
(literal) eleventh amendment case the question is whether the federal
court has the power to entertain the suit. When there is no power,
Congress cannot provide it-even through a clear statement of in-
tent.2 According to Justice Stevens, many of the Court's decisions
which purport to apply the eleventh amendment do not deal with
judicial power. Rather, they treat immunity "as a question of the proper
role of the federal courts in the amalgam of federal-state relations. '2
These cases are "antiethical" to traditional understandings of article III
subject matter jurisdiction in that either the judicial power extends to
a suit against a state, or it does not. Justice Stevens believed these
cases are better understood as invoking comity and federalism con-
cerns.' These latter cases are the ones in which Justice Stevens
believed congressional abrogation is appropriate.2' He explained that
Congress is not superseding a constitutional provision, but "is setting
aside the Court's assessment of the extent to which the use of constitu-
tionally prescribed federal authority is prudent."'  Here, Congress
has decided "the federal interest in protecting the environment
outweighs" any benefits in keeping the states immune from monetary
damages. 1 To the extent state immunity is based on a concern for
comity, and not on a limitation on article III power, "congressional
abrogation is entirely appropriate.,
2
Justice Stevens also addressed the majority's extension of the
availability of monetary damages to private individuals. He stated that
"once judicial power was found to exist to award prospective relief (even
at some monetary cost to the state.. .), it is difficult to understand why




226. Id at 2287.
227. Id
228. Id- at 2287.
229. Id
230. Id. at 2289.
231. Id-
232. Id at 2288 & n.4.
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relief."2" "Compensatory or deterrence interests" alone are insuffi-
cient to overcome the dictates of the eleventh amendment. Stevens
concluded by stating, "Even if a majority of this Court might have
reached a different assessment of the proper balance of state and federal
interests as an original matter, once Congress has spoken, we may not
disregard its express decision to subject the States to liability under
federal law."03
Pennsylvania put forth an argument adopted by Justice Scalia in
his dissent.' Pennsylvania argued the states never would have
ratified the Constitution if they were to be stripped of their "sovereign
authority" except as expressly provided by the constitution.'
Similarly, Justice Scalia argued that the eleventh amendment evidences
the fundamental principle of federalism that the states retain their
"sovereign prerogative of immunity." Therefore, it would be absurd to
think the states would have adopted the eleventh amendment if it had
contained a proviso that nothing contained therein would prevent a
state from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under federal
law.m Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that article III did not
automatically eliminate underlying state sovereign immunity. However,
he disagreed about the amount of sovereign immunity that was
implicitly eliminated by the ratification of the Constitution.=
The plurality's holding, allowing suits for money damages against
the states, upsets what Justice Scalia perceived to be the fundamental
balance between the state and federal powers. Justice Scalia main-
tained sovereign immunity is an "essential element of the constitutional
checks and balances.""0 He stated that sovereign immunity serves to
maintain the "'constitutionally mandated balance of power' between the
States and the Federal Government as adopted by the Framers."'4
1
To Justice Scalia, sovereign immunity is a "structural component of
233. Id at 2287.
234. Id. at 2288 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)).
235. Id. at 2289.
236. Id. at 2295. This latter portion, discussion Congressional power under
the commerce clause was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.
237. Brief of the Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8, Commonwealth
v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1241), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
238. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2299-2300 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
239. See id,. at 2299.
240. Id. at 2300.
241. 1d. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 926 (1985)).
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federalism," and not a mere "default provision" that can be altered by
an act of Congress done pursuant to its article I powers. Justice Scalia
explained that the plurality erred in its steadfast refusal to accept the
fundamental structural importance of the doctrine of sovereignimmunity. This error permitted the plurality to regard abrogation
pursuant to article I as an open question. 2 In Justice Scalia's view,
every word of the Constitution may have its full effect without involving
a compulsive suit against a state for recovery of money. 3 Justice
Scalia further disagreed with the plurality's view that "in approving the
commerce power, the states consented to suits against them based on
congressionally created causes of action."' 4 He stated the plurality's
mere suggestion that this is the kind of consent the Court's cases had
in mind when holding that "'the states may not be sued without their
consent,' did not warrant response.""5
Next, Justice Scalia implied that the federal courts are not the
proper place for the type of suit involved here. The inherent necessity
of a tribunal for the resolution of disputes between the United States
and the individual states or between the states themselves is "incompa-
rably greater," in his view, than the need for a tribunal to solve federal
question disputes between private citizens and the states2 6 Justice
Scalia explained that the Constitution envisions the judicial means to
assure compliance with its laws, but does not require that private
individuals be able to bring suit against the federal government for
violations of the Constitution.2 7 If, as the plurality contended, private
initiation of suits against an offending state is essential to preserve "the
structure," then Justice Scalia found it difficult to see why a private suit
against the United States is not also "essential.""8 If anything, suits
against the United States should be more important, because suits
against the states for violation of the Constitution can be brought by the
federal government. 9 Because federal law has given private citizens
other forms of relief, Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to expand the
available private remedies "to include a remedy not available, for a
similar infraction, against the United States itself."2 °  Thus, in
242. I& at 2303.
243. I& at 2300 (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449
(1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)).
244. Id. at 2285.
245. Id. at 2281.
246. Id at 2298 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Id. (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) and U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9).





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/4
1990] SUPERFUND: STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 587
ratifying the Constitution, the states did not provide unlimited power
to Congress to unilaterally abrogate sovereign immunity. Justice
Scalia's concerns-of the federal government intruding into state
functions and upsetting the fundamental balance of powers-are
legitimate, especially when faced with the reality that Congress does not
represent the views of state legislatures as well as the Court would lead
one to believe.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia also recognized the broad ramifications
of the majority's holding. He stated that Hans has had a persuasive
effect upon statutory law because it automatically assures "that private
damages actions created by federal law do not extend against the
States."' 51 Furthermore, it is "impossible to say how many extant
statutes would have included an explicit preclusion of suits against
states if it had not been thought that such suits were barred automati-
cally." 52 It is even conceivable, at least to Justice Scalia, that the
seventeenth amendment, which eliminated the election of senators by
state legislatures, would have contained a proviso protecting state
sovereign immunity if it had been known at the time of ratification that
the federal government could confer private individuals with causes of
actions reaching state treasuries.
Justice Scalia rejected the plurality's argument that the same
reasons which allow congressional abrogation of state immunity under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment also apply to abrogation under
the commerce clause. Justice Scalia believed the principle of state
sovereignty as embodied by the eleventh amendment is "'necessarily
limited' by the later Amendment,... whose substantive provisions were
'by express terms directed at the States."" Justice Scalia found that
nothing in this reasoning justifies limiting, through appeal, the principle
embodied in the eleventh amendment to antecedent provisions of the
Constitution. He argued the eleventh amendment was "avowedly"
directed against the power of the states and permits abrogation of their
immunity "only for a limited purpose."25 If the commerce power
enables Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, then so do all
the other article I powers. Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that the
plurality's interpretation of the Constitution as permitting Congress to
eliminate sovereign immunity when it wants, "renders the doctrine a
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Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the doctrine of waiver as it applies
to Pennsylvania as an "owner or operator."'  Parden's7 is the only
case in which the Court has held that the federal government can
demand, as a condition to state involvement, the waiver of state
immunity. The holding of Parden, however, was narrowed severely in
Welch, and Justice Scalia would overrule what is left of the Parden
decision. Justice Scalia explained:
[A]ll federal prescriptions are, insofar as their prospective application
is concerned, in a sense conditional, and-to the extent that the
objects of the prescriptions consciously engage in the activity or hold
the status that produces liability-can be redescribed as invitations to
"waiver."1M
Justice Scalia felt that "at the bottom" of all the waiver arguments is
the acknowledgement that deciding the federal government can make
the waiver of state sovereign immunity a condition to state action in a
field that Congress can regulate is the same as finding congressional
authority to eliminate state immunity in the exercise of article I powers.
Justice Scalia said that this is "to adopt the very principle ... [he has]
just rejected." s9  If sovereign immunity has "any reality," it must
mean more than a verbal distinction between finding states liable as
owners and operators and finding them liable as owner and operators
if they chose to be owners and operators.' Thus, Justice Scalia
would have overruled the court of appeals because the federal courts
have no power to entertain the present suit against Pennsylvania for
the reasons he has stated.261
VI. CONCLUSION
The eleventh amendment plays an important role in maintaining
a balance between the powers of the state and federal governments.
The inconsistent application of the scope of this amendment cannot be
reconciled solely by its language or the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution. When a state's eleventh amendment rights have been
abrogated, the state is protected because Congress may abrogate
256. Id. The majority explained that since Union Gas eschewed reliance on
the theory of waiver they need not discuss waiver and do not understand why
Justice Scalia feels the need to do so. Id at 2286 n.5.
257. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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pursuant to plenary constitutional powers only, and it must state clearly
its intent to abrogate. Congress may abrogate pursuant to its article I
powers because of these safeguards.
Creating a cause of action for retroactive damages, however,
destroys all the protections built into our federal system to protect the
states in their roles as sovereigns. The states will not have had notice,
will not have been able to plan their actions, or will not have been able
to structure their budgets to account for the possibility of monetary
liabilities for their acts. Allowing Congress such a broad power to
abrogate impairs the ability of the states to function autonomously and
to serve as an effective counterbalance to federal powers. Permitting
Congress to create retroactive causes of action for damages proceeds too
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